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Abstract
We consider the Kyle-Back model for insider trading, with the difference that the
classical Brownian motion noise of the noise traders is replaced by the noise of a
fractional Brownian motion BH with Hurst parameter H > 12 (when H =
1
2 , B
H
coincides with the classical Brownian motion). Heuristically, for H > 12 this means
that the noise traders has some “memory”, in the sense that any increment from time
t on has a positive correlation with its value at t. (In other words, the noise trading
is a persistent stochastic process). It also means that the paths of the noise trading
process are more regular than in the classical Brownian motion case.
We obtain an equation for the optimal (relative) trading intensity for the insider in
this setting, and we show that when H → 12 the solution converges to the solution in
the classical case. Finally, we discuss how the size of the Hurst coefficient H influences
the optimal performance and portfolio of the insider.
1 Introduction
In their seminal papers Kyle [6] and subsequently Back [2] formulate and study an equilibrium
model for insider trading. There are many papers followed Kyle-Back inspired models that
should be cited. The paper most closely related to ours in setup and method is [1], where
a (classical) Brownian motion model is studied. Here we review then briefly the Kyle-Back
model, based on the presentation in [1]. We assume the financial market has three agents:
• (i) The insider, who already from the initial time t = 0 knows the value v˜ at the
terminal time t = T of a given stock. The portfolio of the insider, measured in terms
of the number of stocks held at time t, is denoted by xt, t ∈ [0, T ]. It is assumed that
v˜ is a centered Gaussian random variable of known variance.
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• (ii) The noise traders, who trade randomly without any information about the market.
The portfolio zt of the noise traders is assumed to have the form
(1.1) dzt = σtdBt , t ∈ [0, T ],
where σt is a given continuous deterministic function and Bt = Bt(ω), (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω,
is a Brownian motion on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t∈[0,T ] , P). It is assumed
that v˜ is independent of the Brownian motion Bt, t ∈ [0, T ].
• (ii) The market makers, who at any time t can observe the total traded volume
(1.2) yt = xt + zt,
but not the separate trades xt, zt. Based on the information (filtration) Fyt , t ∈ [0, T ],
generated by the observations ys, s ≤ t, the market makers set the price of the stock
at time t equal to
(1.3) pt := E [v˜|Fyt ] , 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
The wealth wt at time t of the insider can be expressed as
(1.4) wt = w0 +
∫ t
0
xsdps, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
A priori this is an anticipative stochastic integral, which needs further explanation. If
we assume, as Kyle and Back, that the strategy of the insider has the form
(1.5) dxt = (v˜ − pt)βtdt
for some deterministic continuous function βt > 0, called the insider trading intensity,
then a natural interpretation of (1.4) is obtained by using integration by parts, as
follows:
wt = w0 + xtpt −
∫ t
0
psdxs
= w0 + pt
∫ t
0
(v˜ − ps)βsds−
∫ t
0
ps(v˜ − ps)βsds
= w0 +
∫ t
0
(v˜ − ps)2βsds−
∫ t
0
(v˜ − pt)(v˜ − ps)βsds.(1.6)
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Alternatively, one might obtain (1.6) by interpreting the stochastic integral in (1.4) as a
forward integral. See [8] for definitions and [1] for applications of forward integrals to finance.
The insider tries to find the trading intensity βt which maximizes the expected terminal
wealth
(1.7) E [wT ] = E
[
w
(β)
T
]
= w0 +
∫ T
0
E
[
(v˜ − ps)2
]
βsds−
∫ T
0
E [(v˜ − pT )(v˜ − ps)] βsds.
The dilemma for the insider is that an increased trading intensity at some time t will reveal
more information about the value of v˜ to the market makers and hence induce a price pt
closer to v˜, which in turn implies a reduced insider advantage. The optimal insider trading
strategy is proved to be
(1.8) βt =
σ2t (
∫ T
0
σ2sds)
1
2
S
1
2
0
∫ T
t
σ2sds
; S0 = E
[
(v˜ − E [v˜])2] ,
which gives the optimal mean square error
(1.9) St = E
[
(v˜ − pt)2
]
=
S0
∫ T
t
σ2sds∫ T
0
σ2sds
,
and the optimal insider performance
(1.10) J(β) := E
[
w
(β)
T
]
= w0 +
(
S0
∫ T
0
σ2sds
) 1
2
.
In particular, this implies pT = v˜ and pt = E [v˜] + λyt, where λ =
(
S0R T
0 σ
2
sds
) 1
2
is called the
price sensitivity. See [1] for details.
The purpose of this paper is to study the above model in the case when the Brownian
motion B in (1.1) is generalized to a fractional Brownian motion BH with Hurst parameter
H ∈ (0, 1). By definition BHt , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , is a continuous and centered Gaussian process
with covariance function
(1.11) E
[
BHt B
H
s
]
=
1
2
(
t2H + s2H − |t− s|2H) , 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
If H = 1
2
then BH is the classical Brownian motion B. If H 6= 1
2
the increments of BH are
not independent. For H > 1
2
the two increments
(1.12) BHt+h −BHt and BHs+h −BHs
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are positively correlated, while they are negatively correlated for H < 1
2
. Thus the case
for H > 1
2
corresponds to systems with memory and persistence, while the case of H < 1
2
corresponds to systems with turbulence and anti-persistence. If H > 1
2
then the paths of
BH are more regular than for classical Brownian motion, while if H < 1
2
the paths are less
regular. More precisely, for any α < H the paths of BH are Ho¨lder continuous with exponent
α almost surely, i.e.
(1.13) |BHt −BHs | ≤ c|t− s|α, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
for some (random) constant c > 0. For more information about fractional Brownian motion
and its applications, we refer to [3], [7] and the references therein.
In this paper we restrict ourselves to the case H > 1
2
. In other words, we study how
the introduction of persistence or memory among the noise traders influences the Kyle-
Back model, in particular what effect it has on the optimal insider portfolio and maximal
expected insider wealth. As in the Kyle-Back setting, we assume that v˜ is independent of
BHt , t ∈ [0, T ]. We prove that if an optimal smooth insider trading intensity β exists, then it
is the solution of a non-linear integro-differential equation. Moreover, we show that pT = v˜
in Theorem 2.4.
In the formulation adopted in this paper, we have encountered a new stochastic differential
equations
dyt = (v˜ − E(v˜|Fyt )dt+ σtdBHt .
The existence and uniqueness of the solution to the above equation have not been studied
yet. In Section 2 we shall formulate our problem, obtain an existence result for the above
equation by using the innovation technique, and find an equation that the maximum trading
intensity must satisfy. In Section 3, we study the uniqueness of the above equation. In
Section 4, we discuss the impact of long memory on the insider trader. The Appendix
provide some technical results.
2 The main result
We use the same setup as in Section 1, except that Bt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , is replaced with a fractional
Brownian motion BHt , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , with Hurst parameter H > 12 . Thus the portfolio of the
noise traders gets the form
(2.1) dzt = σtdB
H
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
the portfolio of the insider is as before
(2.2) dxt = (v˜ − pt)βtdt ,
where pt is the market price at time t set by the market makers, which will be made more
precise in next lines (see equation (2.4) below). The total traded volume is hence
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(2.3) dyt = (v˜ − pt)βtdt+ σtdBHt .
If we let Fyt , t ∈ [0, T ], be the filtration generated by ys, s ≤ t, then it is assumed that
(2.4) pt := E [v˜|Fyt ] , 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Substituting this into (2.3) we get that the total traded volume process must satisfy the
equation
(2.5) dyt = (v˜ − E [v˜|Fyt ]) βtdt+ σtdBHt , t ∈ [0, T ] .
As in [1] we will prove that it is possible to find a solution of (2.5) by regarding yt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
as the innovation process y˜t, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , of an auxiliary linear filtering problem, where the
signal process is
(2.6) ξt = v˜; t ∈ [0, T ],
and the observation process is
(2.7) dyˆt = v˜βtdt+ σtdB
H
t ; t ∈ [0, T ], yˆ0 = 0 .
The innovation process for this problem is, by definition,
dy˜t =
(
v˜ − E
[
v˜|F yˆt
])
βtdt+ σtdB
H
t(2.8)
= dyˆt − E
[
v˜|F yˆt
]
βtdt ,
where F yˆt = σ(yˆs , 0 ≤ s ≤ t) is the information filtration generated by yˆ. It is obvious that
we can assume that
E(v˜) = 0 and E(v˜2) = 1 .
We shall show that y˜ solves (2.5). This follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. Assume that
(2.9) s→ βs
σs
∈ C2[0, t]
for all t < T . Then F y˜t = F yˆt for all t ∈ [0, T ].
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Proof. Since
dy˜t = dyˆt − E
[
v˜|F yˆt
]
βtdt,
we see that F y˜t ⊂ F yˆt . We need to prove the other inclusion F yˆt ⊂ F y˜t . First we shall compute
pt := E
[
v˜|F yˆt
]
by using the result obtained in [5]. Define
(2.10) KH(t, s) = κ
−1
H s
1
2
−H(t− s) 12−H ,
where κH = 2HΓ(3/2−H)Γ(1/2 +H). Let
(2.11) y∗t =
∫ t
0
KH(t, s)σ
−1
s dyˆs .
Then from Theorem 1 of [5], we know that y∗t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , is a semimartingale and the
information filtrations generated by y∗ and yˆ are the same:
(2.12) Fy∗t = F yˆt , ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
We also have
(2.13) d〈y∗, y∗〉s = d`(s) , d`(s) := (2− 2H)κ−1H s1−2Hds .
Put
(2.14) γt = E
[(
v˜ − E
[
v˜|F yˆt
])2]
, t ∈ [0, T ],
and define (which is p(s, 0) of (13) in [5])
(2.15) ρs = ρs(β) =
d
d`(s)
∫ s
0
KH(s, r)
βr
σr
dr s ∈ [0, T ].
Then by Section 5.1 of [5] we have
γt = γt(β) =
(
γ−10 +
∫ t
0
ρ2sd`(s)
)−1
, t ∈ [0, T ],(2.16)
for some constant γ0 6= 0 and
pt = γtγ
−1
0
(
p0 + γ0
∫ t
0
ρsdy
∗
s
)
, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
From the definition of pt we have p0 = E [v˜|F0] = E(v˜) = 0 since we assume E(v˜) = 0. Thus
we have
pt = γt
∫ t
0
ρsdy
∗
s , ∀t ∈ [0, T ].(2.17)
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From Lemma 5.3, we have
(2.18) pt =
∫ t
0
g(t, s)dyˆs ,
where
(2.19) g(t, s) = γt
[
KH(t, s)ρt −
∫ t
s
KH(r, s)ρ
′
rdr
]
σ−1s .
For any smooth deterministic function ft, t ∈ [0, T ), we now consider∫ t
0
fsdy˜s =
∫ t
0
fs(dyˆs − E
[
v˜|F yˆs
]
βsds)
=
∫ t
0
fs(dyˆs − psβsds)
=
∫ t
0
fsdyˆs −
∫ t
0
fsβspsds
=
∫ t
0
fsdyˆs −
∫ t
0
fsβs(
∫ s
0
g(s, u)dyˆu)ds
=
∫ t
0
(fu −
∫ t
u
g(s, u)fsβsds)dyˆu .(2.20)
where we have used the Fubini type theorem in (2.20). We want to find a representation of
yˆ in terms of y˜. This is equivalent to find a solution of the equation
(2.21) fu −
∫ t
u
g(s, u)fsβsds = χ[0,t](u) .
By classical results on Volterra equations, see e.g. [4], Lemma 4.3.3 on page 125, this equation
has a solution if
(2.22)
∫ t
0
∫ t
s
β2sg
2(s, r)drds <∞ for all t < T,
where g(s, r) is given by (2.19). By the Lemma 5.2 in the Appendix we obtain that if (2.9)
holds, then (2.22) is satisfied. Therefore we see that F yˆt ⊂ F y˜t . This concludes the proof of
the lemma.
Corollary 2.2. Assume that (2.9) holds. Then y˜t, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , defined by (2.8) is a solution
of (2.5).
Remark 2.3. In view of Corollary 2.2 we choose to represent the total traded volume process
y by y˜, and we write y instead of y˜ from now on. Note however, that we have not proved that
the solution of (2.5) is unique, so this choice is not totally justified from a mathematical point
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of view, since there might be solutions y of (2.5) which are not representable as innovation
processes of linear filtering problems.
On the other hand, since the market makers are assumed to know Fyt and also of course the
price pt at any time t ∈ [0, T ], then by (2.3) and (2.7) they know
(2.23) yˆt = yt +
∫ t
0
psβsds .
This implies that
(2.24) F yˆt = Fyt
and hence dyt = dy˜t, even without hypothesis (2.9). So from a modeling point of view the
assumption that yt = y˜t is natural, and we will base our study on this.
As shown in the introduction the expected terminal wealth of the insider can be expressed
as follows:
(2.25) E(wT ) = w0 +
∫ T
0
E
[
(v˜ − pt)2
]
βtdt−
∫ T
0
E [(v˜ − pT )(v˜ − pt)] βtdt .
We need to compute E [(v˜ − pT )(v˜ − pt)]. We have
E [(v˜ − pT )(v˜ − pt)] = E(v˜2)− E(v˜pt)− E(v˜pT ) + E(pTpt)
= E(v˜2)− E(p2t )− E(p2T ) + E(pTpt) .
We first compute E(pTpt). By (1.3) we have that pt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , is a square-integrable
martingale. Hence
E [ptpT ] = E
[
p2t
]
,
and consequently
E [(v˜ − pT )(v˜ − pt)] = E(v˜2)− E(p2t )− E(p2T ) + E(pTpt)
= E(v˜2)− E(p2t )− E(p2T ) + E(p2t )
= E(v˜2)− E(p2T ) .
But
E(p2T ) = E(v˜
2)− E(v˜ − pT )2 = E(v˜2)− γT ,
and
E [(v˜ − pT )(v˜ − pt)] = γT .(2.26)
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Hence by (2.25) and by (2.26) we want to maximize
(2.27) J(β(·)) = w0 +
∫ T
0
(γt(β)− γT (β))βtdt .
First let us maximize
(2.28) J0(β(·)) =
∫ T
0
γt(β)βtdt .
We do this by using a perturbation argument, as in [1]. Let ε be an arbitrary small number
and ξt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , be an arbitrary smooth function. We want to compute d
dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
J0(β + εξ).
In the following we assume that all functions involved are smooth enough to exchange the
order of derivation and integration. We first note that by the definition (2.15) of ρ we obtain
d
dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
ρs(β + εξ) =
d
d`(s)
∫ s
0
KH(s, r)
ξr
σr
dr .
Thus
d
dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
∫ t
0
[ρs(β + εξ)]
2 d`(s) = 2
∫ t
0
ρs
d
d`(s)
∫ s
0
KH(s, r)
ξr
σr
drd`(s)
= 2
∫ t
0
ρs
d
ds
∫ s
0
KH(s, r)
ξr
σr
drds .(2.29)
We apply this result to compute d
dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
γt(β + εξ). By (2.16) and (2.29) we have
d
dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
γt(β + εξ) = −2γ2t
∫ t
0
ρs
d
ds
∫ s
0
KH(s, r)
ξr
σr
drds
= −2γ2t ρt
∫ t
0
KH(t, r)
ξr
σr
dr + 2γ2t
∫ t
0
ρ′s
∫ s
0
KH(s, r)
ξr
σr
drds
= 2γ2t
∫ t
0
σ−1r
[∫ t
r
ρ′sKH(s, r)ds− ρtKH(t, r)
]
ξrdr .
Putting everything together we obtain
d
dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
J0(β + εξ) =
∫ T
0
γtξtdt+ 2
∫ T
0
βtγ
2
t
{∫ t
0
σ−1r
[∫ t
r
ρ′sKH(s, r)ds− ρtKH(t, r)
]
ξrdr
}
dt
=
∫ T
0
γrξrdr + 2
∫ T
0
σ−1r
{∫ T
r
βtγ
2
t
[∫ t
r
ρ′sKH(s, r)ds− ρtKH(t, r)
]
dt
}
ξrdr .
Since ξr is arbitrary, we have
(2.30) γr = −2σ−1r
∫ T
r
βtγ
2
t
[∫ t
r
ρ′sKH(s, r)ds− ρtKH(t, r)
]
dt ,
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or equivalently
(2.31) σrγr(β) = −2
∫ T
r
βtγ
2
t (β)
[∫ t
r
ρ′s(β)KH(s, r)ds− ρt(β)KH(t, r)
]
dt ,
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Thus we have proved that if
(2.32) β → J0(β(·)) =
∫ T
0
γt(β)βtdt
is maximal, then γt(β) satisfies (2.31). In particular, γT (β) = 0. But this implies that γt(β)
is also optimal for
(2.33) J(β(·)) = w0 + J0(β(·)) = w0 +
∫ T
0
(γt(β)− γT (β))βtdt
since we always have γT (β) ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0. We have proved
Theorem 2.4. Suppose β is an optimal insider portfolio for the problem
(2.34) sup
β
E [wT (β)] = sup
β
{
w0 +
∫ T
0
(γt(β)− γT (β))βtdt
}
.
Then γT (β) = 0 and γt(β) satisfies equation (2.31). In particular, by (2.26)
(2.35) pT = v˜.
Proposition 2.5. The process y defined by
(2.36) dyt =
(
v˜ − E
[
v˜|F yˆt
])
βtdt+ σtdB
H
t , y0 = 0
is an Ht := σ
(
v˜, BHs ; s ≤ t
)
-adapted solution of the equation
(2.37) dy˜t =
(
v˜ − E
[
v˜|F y˜t
])
βtdt+ σtdB
H
t , y˜0 = 0 .
Proof. That y defined by (2.36) is a solution of equation (2.37) follows from Lemma 2.1.
We now let H → 1
2
in equation (2.30) and show how it converges to the equation for the
optimal γ in the case H = 1
2
.
Proposition 2.6. For H → 1
2
equation (2.30) becomes
γr = 2
βr
σ2r
∫ T
r
βtγ
2
t dt , 0 ≤ r ≤ T,
that is equivalent to the equation (4.28) of [1]:
(2.38) 1 = 2
βrγr
σ2r
∫ T
r
βt exp
(
−2
∫ t
r
γuβ
2
u
σ2u
du
)
dt, 0 ≤ r ≤ T,
for the optimal γ in the case H = 1
2
.
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Proof. First of all we note that by (2.10) KH(s, r) converges to 1 for H → 12 . Furthermore
by taking the limit in (2.15) we obtain that ρt goes to
βt
σt
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence (2.30)
becomes
(2.39) γr = 2σ
−1
r ρr
∫ T
r
βtγ
2
t dt = 2
βr
σ2r
∫ T
r
βtγ
2
t dt , 0 ≤ r ≤ T,
if H → 1
2
by uniform integrability. When H → 1/2, the equation (2.16) becomes
γt =
(
1
γ0
+
∫ t
0
(
βs
σs
)2
ds
)−1
, 0 ≤ r ≤ T.
Therefore, γ satisfies
(2.40)
dγt
dt
= −β
2
t
σ2t
γ2t .
Hence for t > r we have that
(2.41) γt = γr exp
(
−
∫ t
r
β2u
σ2u
γudu
)
.
Substituting (2.41) into (2.39), we obtain
(2.42) γr = 2
βr
σ2r
∫ T
r
γ2rβt exp
(
−2
∫ t
r
γuβ
2
u
σ2u
du
)
dt, r ∈ [0, T ].
This is equation (2.38).
3 Uniqueness of the equation
The equation (2.5) which we reproduce here
(3.1) dyt = (v˜ − E [v˜|Fyt ]) βtdt+ σtdBHt , t ∈ [0, T ],
with y0 = 0 is a new type of equation even in the case B
H is replaced by a Brownian motion,
where BH is a fractional Brownian motion of Hurst parameter H, βt and σt are deterministic
functions and v˜ is a standard normal random variable independent of the fractional Brownian
motion BH .
Lemma 2.1 yields the existence of a solution. In Remark 2.3, we explain from economic point
of view the rationale of uniqueness. However, mathematically the uniqueness is still an open
problem mathematically. It is our conjecture that the uniqueness holds as well.
Here we give an attempt to this problem. We restrict the solution to the form
(3.2) yt = h1(t)v˜ +
∫ t
0
h2(t, s)dB
H
s
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for some unknown functions h1(t) and h2(t, s) , 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T . Since v˜ and yt , 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
are jointly Gaussian, there is a g(t, s) , 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T , such that (because E(v˜) = 0 and
E(v˜)2 = 1)
E [v˜|Fyt ] =
∫ t
0
g(t, s)dys
=
∫ t
0
g(t, s)h′1(s)ds v˜ +
∫ t
0
g(t, s)h2(s, s)dB
H
s +
∫ t
0
g(t, s)
∫ s
0
∂
∂s
h2(s, r)dB
H
r ds
=
∫ t
0
g(t, s)h′1(s)ds v˜ +
∫ t
0
[
g(t, s)h2(s, s) +
∫ t
s
g(t, r)
∂
∂r
h2(r, s)dr
]
dBHs .(3.3)
By the property of conditional expectation we have
(3.4) E (ysv˜) = E (ysE [v˜|Fyt ]) , ∀ 0 ≤ s ≤ t .
First we have
E (ysv˜) = h1(s) .
On the other hand, we have
E (ysE [v˜|Fyt ]) = h1(s)
∫ t
0
g(t, u)h′1(u)du
+
∫ r
0
∫ t
0
h2(r, s1)
[
g(t, s2)h2(s2, s2) +
∫ t
s2
g(t, r)h2(r, s2)dr
]
φ(s1 − s2)ds1ds2 ,(3.5)
where
φ(u) = H(2H − 1)|u|2H−2 .
Thus equation (3.4) becomes
h1(s) = h1(s)
∫ t
0
g(t, u)h′1(u)du)
+
∫ r
0
∫ t
0
h2(r, s1
[
g(t, s2)h2(s2, s2) +
∫ t
s2
g(t, r)h2(r, s2)dr
]
φ(s1 − s2)ds1ds2 ,(3.6)
Substituting (3.3) into (3.1), we have
yt =
∫ t
0
(v˜ − E [v˜|Fyr ]) βrdr +
∫ t
0
σrdB
H
r
=
∫ t
0
{
v˜ − v˜
∫ r
0
g(r, s)h′1(s)ds
+
∫ r
0
[
g(r, s)h2(s, s) +
∫ r
s
g(r, u)
∂
∂u
h2(u, s)du
]
dBHs
}
βrdr +
∫ t
0
σrdB
H
r
=
∫ t
0
[
1−
∫ r
0
g(r, s)h′1(s)ds
]
βrdr v˜
−
∫ t
0
{∫ t
s
[
g(r, s)h2(s, s) +
∫ r
s
g(r, u)
∂
∂u
h2(u, s)du
]
βrdr
}
dBHs +
∫ t
0
σrdB
H
r .(3.7)
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Comparing (3.7) with (3.2) and using the fact that v˜ and BHt are independent, we have
h1(t) =
∫ t
0
[
1−
∫ r
0
g(r, s)h′1(s)ds
]
βrdr(3.8)
h2(t, s) = σs −
∫ t
0
{∫ t
s
[
g(r, s)h2(s, s) +
∫ r
s
g(r, u)
∂
∂u
h2(u, s)du
]
βrdr
}
.(3.9)
Thus we obtain
Proposition 3.1. The equation (3.1) has a unique solution of the form (3.2) if the following
system of equations has a unique solution (h1(t), h2(t, s), g(t, s) , 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T ):
h1(t) =
∫ t
0
[
1− ∫ r
0
g(r, s)h′1(s)ds
]
βrdr
h2(t, s) = σs −
∫ t
0
{∫ t
s
[
g(r, s)h2(s, s) +
∫ r
s
g(r, u) ∂
∂u
h2(u, s)du
]
βrdr
}
h1(s) = h1(s)
∫ t
0
g(t, u)h′1(u)du
+
∫ r
0
∫ t
0
h2(r, s1)
[
g(t, s2)h2(s2, s2) +
∫ t
s2
g(t, r)h2(r, s2)dr
]
φ(s1 − s2)ds1ds2 .
The existence of the above system was obtained in Section 2 through the technique of
filtering.
4 The impact of memory (persistence) in the noise
trades
One of the motivations of this paper is to investigate how the memory (persistence) and
regularity of the noise process of the noise traders, represented by the Hurst coefficient
H > 1
2
, influence the performance of the insider.
Unfortunately, we are not able to solve our general equation (2.31) to obtain the optimal
βt = βt(H), t ∈ [0, T ], explicitly, and thus we are unable to make any conclusion about this
influence in general. However, if we restrict ourselves to constant insider trading intensity
β = β(H) > 0, our equations simplify as follows.
Consider σ constant. By (5.1) in Lemma 5.1 we obtain that
ρt = s
2H−2β
σ
∫ s
0
r
1
2
−H(s− r) 12−Hdr
=
β
σ
∫ 1
0
u
1
2
−H(1− u) 12−Hdu
=
Γ(3
2
−H)2
Γ(3− 2H)
β
σ
.(4.1)
Therefore equation (2.16) becomes
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γt =
(
γ−10 +
∫ t
0
ρ2sd`(s)
)−1
=
(
γ−10 + aHt
2−2H β
2
σ2
)−1
,(4.2)
where aH :=
Γ( 3
2
−H)3
2HΓ(3−2H)2Γ( 1
2
+H)
. Hence, we can write down the performance functional as
J(β) = β
∫ T
0
(γt − γT )dt
= β
∫ T
0
1
γ−10 + aHt2−2H
β2
σ2
dt− βT
γ−10 + aHT 2−2H
β2
σ2
.(4.3)
It is easy to see that for a given H ∈ (1
2
, 1) and T > 0, J(β) is a continuous function of β,
J(0) = 0 and lim
β→∞
J(β) = 0. Thus J(β) attains its maximum values over all β > 0. We
illustrate the relation between β and J(β) numerically as plots. We choose T = 2, σ = 1 and
plot the function J(β) for the Hurst parameters H = 0.5 (top curve), H = 0.6 (second from
top), H = 0.75 (third from top), H = 0.9 (fourth from top), and H = 1 (bottom straight
line).
Figure 1: Plot of the functions J(β) for 5 different values of H
x-axis is β and y-axis is J(β)
The graphs show that the performance of an insider decreases with increasing H ∈ [1
2
, 1).
They also show that the optimal insider trading intensity β∗(H) decreases with increasing
H ∈ [1
2
, 1). These results can perhaps be understood as follows. Increasing the Hurst
coefficient H of the noise trading reduces the “complexity” of the noise in two ways:
(i) the noise process becomes more persistent, and
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(ii) the paths of the noise process become more regular.
Both these effects contribute to the decrease of the information advantage of the insider,
because with reduced noise the actions of the insider become more apparent to the market
makers. Thus increasing H might have the same effect on the insider performance as reducing
the noise level |σ| in the classical Brownian motion model (H = 1
2
).
Similarly, the decrease of the optimal trading intensity β∗(H) with increasing H, is also in
line with what happens when |σ| decreases in the classical setting. (See Section 1).
It is not clear, though, what the effects of increasing H would be if the portfolios β were
allowed to vary with time.Then the insider might be able to take advantage of the increased
“predictability” of the noise traders to increase her performance, and this might outweigh
the disadvantage coming from reduced noise complexity mentioned above.
In either case, we have not been able to give rigorous proofs of any of these statements
regarding the effects of increasing H, and we leave the task of doing so as an open problem.
5 Appendix
In this appendix we provided some technical computations needed in the previous sections.
Lemma 5.1. If βr, σr are twice differentiable and σr > 0 on [0, T ], then
ρs = s
2H−2
∫ s
0
r
1
2
−H(s− r) 12−H βr
σr
dr(5.1)
+ (2− 2H)−1s2H−2
∫ s
0
r
3
2
−H(s− r) 12−H d
dr
[
βr
σr
]
dr ,
ρ′s = −
[
1 + (2− 2H)−1] s2H−3 ∫ s
0
r
3
2
−H(s− r) 12−H d
dr
[
βr
σr
]
dr(5.2)
− (2− 2H)−1s2H−3
∫ s
0
r
5
2
−H(s− r) 12−H d
2
dr2
[
βr
σr
]
dr ,
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
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Proof. By definition (2.15) for ρ, we obtain
ρs =
d
d`(s)
∫ s
0
KH(s, r)
βr
σr
dr
= (2− 2H)−1κHs2H−1 d
ds
[∫ s
0
KH(s, r)
βr
σr
dr
]
= (2− 2H)−1s2H−1 d
ds
[
s2−2H
∫ 1
0
u
1
2
−H(1− u) 12−H βsu
σsu
du
]
= (2− 2H)−1s2H−1
[
(2− 2H)s1−2H
∫ 1
0
u
1
2
−H(1− u) 12−H βsu
σsu
du
+s2−2H
∫ 1
0
u
1
2
−H(1− u) 12−H d
ds
[
βsu
σsu
]
du
]
=
∫ 1
0
u
1
2
−H(1− u) 12−H βsu
σsu
du+ (2− 2H)−1s
∫ 1
0
u
1
2
−H(1− u) 12−H d
ds
[
βsu
σsu
]
du
= s2H−2
∫ s
0
r
1
2
−H(s− r) 12−H βr
σr
dr
+ (2− 2H)−1s2H−2
∫ s
0
r
3
2
−H(s− r) 12−H d
dr
[
βr
σr
]
dr .
Taking the derivative again we have
ρ′s =
[
1 + (2− 2H)−1] ∫ 1
0
u
1
2
−H(1− u) 12−H d
ds
[
βsu
σsu
]
du
+ (2− 2H)−1s
∫ 1
0
u
1
2
−H(1− u) 12−H d
2
ds2
[
βsu
σsu
]
du
Denote r = su. Then
d
ds
[
βsu
σsu
]
= u
d
dr
[
βr
σr
]
,
d2
ds2
[
βsu
σsu
]
= u2
d2
dr2
[
βr
σr
]
.
16
Therefore,
ρ′s =
[
1 + (2− 2H)−1] ∫ 1
0
u
1
2
−H(1− u) 12−H d
ds
[
βsu
σsu
]
du
+ (2− 2H)−1s
∫ 1
0
u
1
2
−H(1− u) 12−H d
2
ds2
[
βsu
σsu
]
du
=
[
1 + (2− 2H)−1] ∫ 1
0
u
3
2
−H(1− u) 12−H d
dr
[
βr
σr
]
du
+ (2− 2H)−1s
∫ 1
0
u
5
2
−H(1− u) 12−H d
2
dr2
[
βr
σr
]
du
= − [1 + (2− 2H)−1] s2H−3 ∫ s
0
r
3
2
−H(s− r) 12−H d
dr
[
βr
σr
]
dr
+ (2− 2H)−1s2H−3
∫ s
0
r
5
2
−H(s− r) 12−H d
2
dr2
[
βr
σr
]
dr .
Lemma 5.2. Suppose
sup
0≤r≤t
{∣∣∣∣βrσr
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ ddr
(
βr
σr
)∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ d2dr2
(
βr
σr
)∣∣∣∣} <∞ .
Then
sup
0≤s≤t
[|ρs|+ |ρ′s|] <∞ .
Proof. We use C to denote a generic constant which may have different value in different
occurrences. From Lemma 5.1 and the assumption, we have
|ρs| ≤ C
[
s2H−1
∫ s
0
r
1
2
−H(s− r) 12−Hdr + s2H−2
∫ s
0
r
3
2
−H(s− r) 12−H dr
]
≤ Cs ≤ C .
|ρ′s| ≤ C
[
s2H−3
∫ s
0
r
3
2
−H(s− r) 12−H dr + s2H−3
∫ s
0
r
5
2
−H(s− r) 12−Hdr
]
≤ C + Cs ≤ C .
Finally we need to express
∫ t
0
ρsdy
∗
s in terms of
∫ t
0
ρ˜sdyˆs, where y
∗ and yˆ are defined through
(2.11).
Introduce the following operator
T (f)(t) =
d
dt
∫ t
0
KH(t, s)fsds , f ∈ C1([0, T ] ;R) .
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Then up to an argument of approximation for yt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , by smooth functions and from
y∗s =
∫ s
0
KH(s, r)σ
−1
r dyˆr =
∫ s
0
KH(s, r)σ
−1
r
˙ˆyrdr ,
we can write ∫ t
0
ρsdy
∗
s =
∫ t
0
ρsT (σ
−1 ˙ˆy)(s)ds .
Let T ∗t be the transpose of T on the interval [0, t], more precisely, T
∗
t is defined by the
following identity:∫ t
0
gr(T (f)(r))dr =
∫ t
0
(T ∗t (g)(r))frdr ,∀ nice smooth functions f , g ∈ C1([0, T ] ;R) .
Then ∫ t
0
ρsdy
∗
s =
∫ t
0
(T ∗t (ρ)(s)σ
−1
s dyˆs .
A simple computation yields that
T ∗t (ρ)(s) = KH(t, s)ρt −
∫ t
s
KH(r, s)ρ
′
rdr .
Therefore, we have
Lemma 5.3. For any continuous function ρ : [0, T ]→ R, we have
(5.3)
∫ t
0
ρsdy
∗
s =
∫ t
0
[
KH(t, s)ρt −
∫ t
s
KH(r, s)ρ
′
rdr
]
σ−1s dyˆs .
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